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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\L\LK ER BASK AXD TReST CO:M-
l'c\\ Y. Adrnini~trator of the Estates of 
.\11\.'\ETTA WALKER, aka NETTIE 
\L\LK EH. dt>eemwd, and ILA .MIN-
\ ET'L\ WALKER, deceased, and 
J()llX A. \YALKl·~H, deceased, and 
H. £. WALKER, ROMA 'V ALKER 
(;HOCK and AL TA FAY ·w ALKER 
LAKE, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
and 
.J. B. WALKER, 
I ni:oluntary Plaintiff, 
vs 
J\r~TIN 'VALKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case 
No.10374 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents 
~ATl-RE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
J)pf endant has sufficiently indicated the nature of the 
l'a~u and the trial court's disposition of it. Defendant has 
al~o indicated the necessity for making reference to the 
rPc·ord of Walkf'r Bank & Trust Co., et al. v. J.B. Walker 
whieh was triPd as a companion of the instant case. That 
n·c·ord has been certified as supplemental record herein. 
1 
W~en reference to the J. B. \Y alk<>r ca::;e is made in thj, 
brief, such reference will de::;i(J"nate the "J B \\' R · 
b • • • l'COrd: 
STATEl\lENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-appellant is one of six children of John 
A. and l\Iinnetta \Valker. Plaintiffs-re::;pondents ar~ llli 
mother's personal representative, his deceased sister'~ 
personal representative and all his living brothers and 
::;isters. 
John and Minnetta settled on approximately fom 
acres in Union, Utah, at about the turn of the cen~. 
Title to a part of that acreage was vested in jlinnetta 
alone from the time of acquisition. This is the acre~ 
shown in pink on Exhibit 3. 
John A. \V alker died in 1912. Except for about ont 
year in 1952-3, Minnetta lived in the family home un~J 
her death in N overnber of 1959, at the age of eighty-nine. 
During that year, she lived with and was cared for by her 
daughter Fay (R. 119). Until 1933, most of her childm 
were living with her. After 1938, one or both of hir 
daughters, Roma and Ila, lived with her and cared for 
her ( R. 119, 120, 143, 166, 244, 251, et seq.) Especiail; 
after 1940, that care involved extensive effort. Minnetta 
was frequently bedfast (R. 243-6); her legs requireddsil1 
wrapping (R. 120); her stomach required daily pumpiD! 
( R. 166, 251). She needed, and received from her dallP-
ters all the services of a cook, housekeeper and nurse 
(R. '120, 121, 243-6, 251-4). Ila and Roma were the ehie! 
means of Minnetta's financial support throughout !kt 
period (R. 120, 159, 203, 217, 440, 470). 
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I 
J 
,John A. and l\linnetta ·walker had carried on two 
f~ind~ of gainful activity on the tracts they settled. They 
opt>rntPd a storP, and they farmed. After John's death, 
.\I rnrwtta eontinut.>d the operation of both. All the chil-
.ir1·n assistPd in the farm work as farmers' children do. 
,\ftPr 1~1:~3, wht>n defrndant married, there were no male 
diildn·n at home to operate the farm. Defendant moved 
to a 1io11u· very dm;e to his mother's and entered into 
a ('(1lll rad for the use of the farm. The terms of the 
('ontra.et wPre such that defendant occupied the farm and 
r"tained tht> proceeds from the sale of its produce in con-
:'idl·rntion only of his payment of the taxes (JBW Record 
11. ljlj, .J B\V Exh. P.-14, Record page 435 et seq.). We 
"di lat Pr discuss this contract in detail. Defendant paid 
the tax\:'s and no other rental; he controlled the property 
alisolutPly (R. ±3ti), decided what to plant (R. 436) and 
could have excluded his mother from the farm (although 
not from the house) had he desired (R. 437). 
During the period defendant was the tenant of the 
farm, he provided some hay for his mother's cows; he 
also reeeived milk and other dairy products from her 
( R 247). The record is saturated with testimony about 
tlit> abundance or paucity of the hay provided and the 
dairy products received in return, but the court could 
n•asonably have believed that the exchange, in value, 
ww about even. 
In 19±8, .Minnetta Walker suffered serious illness by 
n,ason of pyloric obstruction. She was then seventy-
1·ight yPars old. The "debilitation" caused by that ob-
struetion eould, in the opm10n of her physician, have 
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caused some mental changes at that time ( R. 301). 0th~· 
witnesses testified to a marked decline in her inent~ 
condition after this illness ( R. 122--1, 189, 252). In 19:~ 
while living in Nevada \vi th her daughter Fay, she W8.\ 
clearly disoriented (R. 266). In 1954, a few months ht 
fore she executed the deeds in controversy, she was again 
hospitalized. At this time, the hospital records show sh· 
demonstrated all the objective and subjective symptomi 
of senile dementia. She had extensive artereosclero~1 ~ 
bilateral arcus senilis was observed; she was deforml'I! 
by arthritis; she could remember none of her history 1r 
even that she had recently eaten or seen the doctor (Ext. 
P-9). 
Throughout 1954, ~linnetta exhibited these general 
indicia of senility. Her conversation was sparse and con. 
sisted of continued repetitions of phrases such as ''aren: 
they pretty" about quilting blocks or flowers (R.m1 
Her coherent statements were about events of the remot~ 
past which she was apparently re-living (R. 276, 21i),ana 
and she would forget having eaten as soon as the dishei 
were cleared ( R. 177). There is no question about her in· 
ability to care for herself. Defendant's wife would brin; 
her prepared baby food for lunch when Roma was awa: 
working, and feed it to her (R. 172). There were manr 
instances when Minnetta failed to recognize her children 
by sight ( R. 243, 244) or name ( R. 178) or confuse there 
with her deceased brothers ( R. 243). \Vhen she wa.'l ab!• 
to leave her bed after her return from the hospital m 
the summer of 1954, she continually "shuffled" to ani 
from the outside toilet (R. 245) making each trip withonl 
apparent memory of the last. 
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111 ( >dolwr of 1954, while Roma was away at work, 
defrndant put his mother in his car and took her to the 
: 1ank wht>n' a hank officer witnessed her signature on two 
dt>( d~ 11n·pared by an attorney at defendant's request. 
Ir' tlw,,1• an' valid deeds, she then conveyed to defendant 
l'':t·rytlting of value she owned---certainly everything 
,Ji.i"·ndant believed she owned (R. 438, 9) and disinherited 
lier daug-hter Ila, who had lived with her and financially 
,,u 1.p(lrtt•d her for fifteen years, her daughter Roma, 
,, Jio \\~a:-; nursing her, cleaning her, cooking for her and 
111·oyidtng rnorn'y for her maintenance at that very time, 
and h1·r daughter Fay, who had cared for her during the 
J'l'l'('eding year ( R-119, 248). 
Defendant's strategem, on the day the deeds were 
;-;igrwd, workl'<l well. He was able to get his mother (de-
::; pitP the extreme difficulty her movement entailed-R. 
:ns) to the bank at an hour when Roma was away and 
after banking hours when no bank customers who might 
know the ·walker family could observe (R. 348). He 
tlwn "buried" the deeds and made no mention of them 
until his mother's death when he promptly and triumph-
antly recordPd them (Exhibits P-4, P-6). 
LatP in 1954, defendant's sister Ila was terminally ill 
of eaneer (J<:xh. P-1, 2). She was then addicted to a drug 
called "demerol ". Defendant visited her frequently (R. 
1 i-t) def'pite her evident dislike for him when she was 
WPll (Exhibit P-8). By December, Ila was making refer-
Pfi('l'I:' to dPfondant as the only person in her family she 
eould trust (H. 330), and by Christmas she had delivered 
a111l eonveyed to defendant, upon an orally expressed 
5 
trust, everything of valuP shP had accmnulated in ht 
lifetime of ernploy11wnt. The property transforn·d inr 
eluded bonds and cash in Pxcess of $-1,000.00 (JB\\' &,. 
pp. 19, 20). It includt>d 33 shares of stock in l'tah l' .. 
O\\er 
& Light Company ( J B W Hecord, p. 19) and 15 share~ 
111 
Amalgamated Sugar Company stoek (JB\\' Reeord ~· 
19). In addition, Ila then eoffveyPd to dt>fendant re:JJ 
property having a value at that time of approximateh 
$3,000.00 ( JB\V Hecord, p. 291). The securities anrl 
realty have appreciated substantially in the ensuing 
tPn years ( J B\V Record, p. 297). 
Of these assets, Defendant expended approximately 
$3,S50.00 in payment of the expenses of Ila's !Mt illne~1 
and burial ( J B \V Record, p. 20) Ile retained thereafte1 
assets having a value near $5,000.00. He admits the prop. 
erties were to be utilized only for the benefit of his mother 
( R. p. 8). Nevertheless, as he expended moneys on llli 
mother's behalf thereafter, he kept careful account (JB\\' 
Record - pp. 23-38) and filed tax returns by which ht 
represented these payments Wl•re out of his own resourt'f'1 
( R. p. 441) so that he could claim his mother was a dt-
pendent. He so represented even though he knew, as fit 
himself testified, that the trust was the source of \nP 
money ( R. 441). 
Defendant has steadfastly refused to account fortht 
assets he received from Ila, has denit>d obligation to do~" 
(R. p. 161) and responds to demands with the bare ~tak 
ment that the trust properties were exhausted in the 111 
complishment of the trust purposes (R. pp. 8-9). Defenfr 
ant contends that, by a process of self-dealing and('(\. 
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111 ingling of trust assPts with his own, he has acquired 
tlw :-1•1·uriti<•s and realty which were the corpus of the 
trll,.. t. 
ARGUMEN1, 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF CON-
FlllE~TIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT 
.~:\V m:-::- ..\!OTHER AND THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 
DEED~ IN CONTROVERSY WERE PROCURED BY UNDUE 
!XFLl'ENCE AND ABUSE OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. 
Dd't>1Hla11t-appellant suggests, in the opening para-
!!ntphs of his bri<>f, that this court may approach the 
e\·idence in an "equitable proceeding" as a trial de novo 
on tht· n·eord, place its own interpretation on the testi-
111011,,- and make new findings without regard for those 
fadors of witiwss appearance and demeanor which only 
tl11· trial judg-e ran appraise. This has not been the posi-
t11•n of this Court. \Yhatever the nature of the proceed-
ings, thP trial ('ourt's findings are accorded the greatest 
rt>spPd. In Jeu-ell l'. Horner, 366 P.2d 594; 12 U. 2d 328, 
Justiee Callist<•r stated what is the universal doctrine 
in this reg-ard: 
"This case is one in equity. The dominant 
q1wstion here is whether the plaintiffs, by clear 
eonvineing and satisfactory proof, established the 
alh·gt·d parol trust with respect to the real prop-
Prty. The trial court so found, and this court, upon 
rPviPw, should not set aside the finding of the 
lmver eourt unless it manifestly appears that the 
lowN eourt has misapplied proven facts or that 
the finding is dearly against the weight of the 
evidenee." 
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(Citing Jensen i·. Hou:P!l, 75 l'ah G4 28')P 
1034; Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 4~n 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465· Ha'· 
v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229.) ' u, 
To begin with, the trial court found there to hat, 
been, in 1954, a confidential relationship betwp.en the dt-
f endant and his mother. This finding must stand un 
less, in the words of Jewell v. J-1 orner, it is "clearil 
against the weight of the evidence." It should be helpf~ 
to review, therefore, the concept of confidential relation. 
ship and what kind of evidence, under the cases, will p~. 
tablish it. 
The doctrine is widely accepted that, where a "con. 
fidential relationship" in fact exists between a grantor 
and grantee, the grantee who is accused of acquiring th~ 
property by abuse of the confidence reposed in him lw 
the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. 
This court subscribed to the doctrine in Jardine v. Arch1--
bald, 3 U. 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 454, by this language: 
"It is well settled that where a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship exists between the donor 
and donee, equity raises a presumption against the 
validity of such transactions and the burden is r.ast 
upon the donee to prove their validity and ~at 
there was no fraud or undue influence by proVlilg 
affirmatively and by clear and convincing e:ri~enre 
compliance with equitable requisites .. T~s is so 
because there is implied in every fiduciary or 
confidential relationship a superiority held by on.e 
of the parties over the other. See Pomeroys 
Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. Vol. 3, Sec. 956. 
page 790." 
8 
.... 
and again in ,Johnson L John::;on, 9 r. 2nd 40, 337 P. 2d 
-t~(I (l!(J~)), by this language: 
"ln as~mying the sufficiency of proof, the 
plaintiffs here have significant help in the rule 
that whPn a confidential relationship is shown to 
exist and a gift or conveyance is made to a party 
in a superior position, a presumption arises that 
tl11• transaction was unfair. The presumption has 
tlw fore·<· of evidence. Therefore the burden was 
upon tiH· df•fondant Calvin Johnson to convince the 
court h~· a preponderance of the evidence that the 
transaetion was fair. If he failed to do so, the find-
ing to the contrary was justified, and will not 
hP disturbed on appeal unless the contrary evi-
dPn<'e was so clear and persuasive that all reason-
ahl" minds would so find." 
\Citing Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72 
nah -!7-l-, 271 P. 797, quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity 
Juri.~·prudcnce, sec. 956. In re Swan's Estate, 4 
lltah 2d '277, 293 P.2d 682.) 
\\'hat eonstitutes a "confidential relationship" has 
ht->en thP suhjt-ct of frequent litigation, and the phrase 
has !wen gin"'n a much broader meaning than "fiduciary 
rl:'lationship." lt exists whenever confidence is reposed 
by a weaker person in a stronger one. The term is de-
f'inPd in Corpus Juris Secundum (26 CJS 772) as follows: 
''Confidential relations between grantor and 
grantee are not restricted to those formally recog-
nized as fiduciary in character. The courts care-
fully refrain from defining particular instances 
of such relationships in a manner which might ex-
elnde new cases wherein the relation was in fact 
eonfidential, and, broadly speaking, the term 'con-
fidential relationship' extends to all cases wherein 
trust is reposed on one side and a dominant influ-
9 
ence is exerC'ised on the other. Stated oth · 
·t l l · erw1se i ias WPn said that tlw krm 'fiduciary r I t' : 
d . l . . . ea ton ~s us~ m t 11s con!1P~'.t_10n is a very hroad one, that 
it exists, and rt>hef is granted in all ra.,, · 
. • ' . ~l> tr· ~vluch .mf1uenc~' has bel~n acquired and ahrn;ed, 1i:, 
m wluch eonfidence has bel•n reposPd and b ... 
trayed, and that the origin of th<> confidente ani· 
the source of the influence are immaterial.'' · 
Generally, tlw fact of kinship alone is not Pnough 
111 
establish tlw confidPntial naturP of a rPlationship. It i~ 
just persuasiv<~ PvidPnee. It should appPar by somf' adrli 
tional Pvidenee that ( 1) the grantor n·ally did repo~~ 
trust and eonfidt-rn•p in thP grant<>t', and (:2) tlw g-rantee 
was able to PXPrcise a dominant influPncP. This court ha~ 
had at lPast two occasions to expres8 i tHP lf as to the kind 11f 
evidence which will suffice. In Hairs i·. Jen sen, llli [. ~1~. 
209 P.2d 229, this court said: 
''The defendant contends that there is no al-
legation of a confidential relation between Ambn 
and ~Irs. Haws. TruP, it is not spPcifically allegeJ 
that there was a confidential relation. However, 
in the complaint it is allegPd that Mrs. Haws con-
veyed the property to Amber intending that th-
latter hold the property in trust for the bent'f1t 
of the whole family. Implicit in this allegation ii 
that :Mrs. Haws reposed confidence in .Amber: 
otherwise, Mrs. Haws would have not m~de tlw 
convf'vance. Thus this allegation along with the 
fact that the grantor and grantee were mother and 
daughter, which appears on .the face of t~e co~; 
plaint, is a sufficient allegation of a co~f1denh~ 
relation. Scott on Trust, Y ol. I, Sec. +±.2, state~. 
'A constructive trust is imposed even ii 
there is no fiduciary relationship ~ue~ as th&~ 
between attorney and client, pnnc1pal an 
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agPnt, trusteP and lwneficiary; it is sufficient 
that tht>n' is a family relationship or other 
pt>rsonal rPlationship of such a character 
that tlw transforor is justified in believing 
that tlw transferee will act in his interest.' " 
111 J11l111sn11 1. Johnson (supra), this Court found a 
1 ont'1d1·11tial n·lationship on the basis of kinship (parent-
d1:ld) 1ilu:- thP faet that the grantor reposed confidence 
111 tlw grantl-1· as "t>pitomized by his cooperating with 
li1111 rn 111aking final arrangemt>nts about his property in 
1h1· t>\'l'l1tuality of dt>ath". The element of domination by 
tilt' gra11t1·1· was supplit>d, as the court said, by the evi-
d•·rn·1· that th1• grantor was "becoming senile, and was so 
ah·dPd that Ju· would he t>asy prey to a scheming person 
in whom ht> had confidence". (Our emphasis.) 
ln tlw instant cast>, the evidence of the two necessary 
1·h·1111·11ts, ( 1) trust and confidence actually reposed and 
(~I th1· <lt>fendant's being the superior in influence, are 
strong-Pr by far than in the Johnson case. We have the 
dt>fPmlant's own tl>stimony (R-439) that his mother trust-
"d him and his opinions about the property ''implicitly" 
and had confidPnce in him, and that he talked with her 
ahout tht• property "at intervals" in 1954 (R-439). We 
furtlwr han"' his testimony that she conferred with him 
aiiuut pussiblt> sales of the property in 1933 and 1947 
1 llPposition, p. 3-1-36). As to defendant's being the domi-
nant 1u·rsonality, we have abundant evidence, not of her 
"hp1·01ning'' s1.•nile but of her being senile. Dr. Young, 
h1·r physician, said so in so many words-"She was senile" 
l It :n ti). Dr. Young was defendant's witness. We have 
alr1·ady n·viP\n•d the other evidence in detail. On the 
11 
question of her being "easy prf'y to a seht>ming }>€rson 
whom she had confidence," we believe the folio .· in 
. . \\mg ex. 
cerpt from the testimony of Shirlev 'Valker John d · · son e 
fendant's daughter, is eloquent (R. 395, G): ' . 
"Q. D h o you ave any statement to make as tr 
whether your grandmother was alert du · : 
this period of time~ nng 
A. I think she remembered things that were _ 
s~e couldn't remember the day. She had her 
hme confused on the day, but she knew-I 
mean she knew me, and she would remember 
those things. 
Q. Did she talk about her family T 
A. I didn't talk to her too much. I can't remember 
specific things. She talked about the weather. 
She was appreciative of my taking food .Am. 
one who took her food she was appreciati~e 
of, even though it was pureed baby food, and 
she was so grateful because she appreciated 
things that people did for her." 
Defendant has cited and quoted from Utah ease5 
which hold that "the relation of parent and child ... 
does not, in and of itself, create any such preswnption." 
This kind of statement cannot be contorted to suggest, 
. however, that the fact of the relationship should be ig-
nored. In Utah, as elsewhere, the fact that the suspeet 
transaction is between parent and child is a matter of 
some consequence. In the view of the recognized trn~ 
authorities, some of whom have been quoted by this 
Court, family relationship is strong if not fully persua-
sive evidence of "confidential relationship". Professor 
Bogert, in Chapter 24 of his exhaustive work on frosts 
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11111/ Tr11sf1cs (st'P pag<> :205 of Yolume Ill) comments on 
till' irnli('ia of the ''confich•ntial relationship" as follows: 
'' l f, hy rPason of kinship, business associa-
tion, disparity in age, or physical or mental condi-
tion, or otlwr rPason, the grantee is in an espe-
"iall~· intimatP position with regard to the grantor, 
and th<' lattPr imposes a high degree of trust and 
<'onfidPncP in the former, the court may find the 
n·lationship is tPchnically 'confidential.' The mere 
PxistPncl' of such a connection prohibits the one 
trustPd from seeking any selfish benefit for him-
sl'lf, during the course of the relationship, and 
g1ws ground for fastening a constructive trust 
upon tlw property in the hands of B, the grantee, 
irrespective of his oral promise to use it for the 
lwnefit of another." 
Professor Bogert then quotes with approval from the 
California casP of Brison v. Brison, 17 Pac. 689: 
"The hPtrayal of such confidence is construc-
tivel:v fraudulent, and gives rise to a constructive 
trm;t. This is independent of any element of ac-
tual fraud. • • • The law, from considerations of 
public policy, presumes such transactions to have 
heen induced by undue influence." 
Scott on Trusts in Yolume 1, page 253, Section 44.2, 
comments on the kind of relationship which is presumed 
to be confidential: 
... • • A constructive trust is imposed even 
though there is no fiduciary relation such as that 
between attorney and client, principal and agent, 
trustee and beneficiary; it is sufficient that there 
is a f arnily relationship or other personal rela-
tionship of such a character that the transferor 
is justified in believing that the transferee will 
aet in his interest." 
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One thing is axiomatic about und1w influu11 •• : . ' . ( t' ' I t I , 
sPldorn exprc•1sed in tlw prPsenc•p of thosp \\'ho a · ·.· 
. . re mt1>n 11 
Pd to hP m.JUr<>d. Tlwr<> are innm1wrahle judieial state. 
ments to tht> t>ffoct that thP PvidPnep may and usut:t: 
mm;t he eircmnstantial. Tlw Alabama Court in Pl ·11·· 
i:. Ford, lG-1 80. 2d 908, rPcently said: 
II , ,,. 
''Evidenct> to show undue influence in th' 
proc~rPnu•nt of a det>d must be largely circuru. 
stantial and need not be of that din•et, affirmatir, 
and positive eharacter required to Pstablish a tan. 
gible fact". (and see Bounds v. Bounds, 382 SW2d 
947 - Texas, 1963) 
Courts are frpquently confrontPd with tlw situati11~ 
wlwre onP of SPVt>ral ehildrPn has procured thr 1·on. 
veyancP to him of all or most of a parent's pro1wrty 
as the parent approaclws sPnility or death. The cases 
fall readily into pattern, and the circumstaners which 
mark the exercise of undue influence havt> been the sub-
ject of frpquent comml'nt. The t>ditors of Corpus .Jurn 
Secundum devote several pages of tht>ir treatise on 
deeds to this point. Beginning at page 766 of Yolwn~ 
2G (Deeds§ 62) they say: 
''Particular circumstances which should bl' 
taken into consideration in determining whether 
a deed was procured ·by undue influence include 
the character of the transaction, the divergencr 
of results accomplished from results normally tr 
be anticipated, the inequality of di~trib~tion, th: 
situation of the grantor, the relationship of th 
parties, the activity of the beneficiary an? th~ 
Participation by the transferee or his agent m the · d rnanntr preparation of the deed, the tune an 
of offering suggestions or advice and the under· 
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!\·:ng 111otiw tlu•n•of, and the grantor's condition 
c;f 1;1ind and body." 
l t will :-'PI"VP to ernphasize the soundness of the 
,.,,urt':-: finding in the instant case to consider the evi-
d•·ll''(' nt' Pa<'h of these "circumstanct>s" separatt>ly. 
A 
th /J/11 l'f/1'11C<' of Results from Those Normally 
To Be Anticipated 
Tlw n·:-'ult of tlw conveyances, if they are upheld, 
\1 as to <lisinliPrit fivt> of six children. Two of them, Ila 
arnl Howa, had lived with the grantor practically all 
tlwir liws, ha<l lwPn the principal source of her financial 
snpport and had rninistered to her incessantly, not only 
in ordinary hou::wkeeping, cooking and laundering -
all without inside plumbing, running water or central 
IH'ating (It :no, 371) - but also in the performance of 
tlw disagreeable tasks of nursing, the daily wrapping 
of uleerat<'<l ll·gs and the incredibly recurrent pump-
i11g of lwr stornach. It is hardly to be anticipated that 
a rnotlwr would disinherit such daughters, just as both 
of th1·m had become seriously ill, in favor of a son who 
was e111i1wntly employable, in no financial need and in 
no physieal distn'ss. 
B 
The Inequality of Distribution 
'i'11P eonvPyances in question worked as unequal a 
distribution as one can achieve among six children. 
Ont> got all, and five got none. 
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c 
The Situation of The Grantor 
At the time of the execution of the deeds the gran· 
' lOr 
was living in a condition which, except for the herculean 
efforts of her daughters, would have constituted ex. 
treme privation for o·ur society. Before 19-18, when sht 
was alert and coherent, she repeatedly spoke of her re-
liance on her real property for her old age. (R -178 R 
' 476) Nevertheless, the defendant insists she freely con-
veyed to him every asset she possessed without con-
sideration and left herself completely impoverished. 
D 
The Relationship of the Parties 
The grantor and grantee were, of course, mother 
and son. He had, for many years, farmed the premises. 
She consulted with him about possible sales (Deposition 
pp. 34, 35). In his own words, she trusted him "im-
plicitly" (R-439). In response to the question: "Do you 
think your mother trusted your opinion about the prop-
erty f', defendant said: "There is no question in my 
mind about that." One wonders what evidence could 
more directly bear on the question of whether defen-
dant enjoyed a relationship of which he could tak~ 
advantage. 
E 
The Activity of The Beneficiary 
Defendant's activity in the procurement of the deeds 
demonstrates patience and planning. As late of 19fi, 
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lt!· had offt>rl'd his mother $1,000.00 per acre for the 
Jiuid in qut>stion. (Deposition of Austin Walker, page 
.+ 1 : I:-1 Sti). Although she became increasingly senile -
niarkedly so during the period of pyloric obstruction 
111 1 q4:-, - lu' made no ostensible effort to obtain the 
prop1·rty again until 1954. The time was particularly 
auspieious for the "discussions about the property" 
,1·tii(·h h1· had with his mother in 1954. Ila was hospital-
IZt't l and soon to die. Rmna, recovering from heart 
:--urg-11 ry and commuting by bus to Salt Lake employ-
n111nt with the Deseret Sunday School, was not pre-
~1·nt to protect herself. To the degree that Minnetta 
1·11ul<l n~eeive impressions and be influenced, defendant 
had, for tht' first time, a free hand in moulding her 
thoughts. Tht'n' is little question about the kind of 
notion dl'fendant sought to instill. He continues to labor 
tit(• arguments that he has "paid the truces and fanned 
tlw land". He somehow excludes from his conscious-
1wss the fact - uncontradicted in the evidence - that 
he has paid taxes as cheap rental for the land and 
farmed it for profit. He acquired no right or equity 
in tlw land by his lease contract. He was, in fact, taking 
advantage of his family relationship by occupying the 
farm at so low a rental. Mr. Fletcher, a land appraiser 
,,·hose qualifications are unimpeachable, testified (JBW 
RPeord p 297) that a reasonable rental for the farm 
during the total period of defendant's occupancy would 
haw been $18,270.00. The farm included, of course, the 
lands in issue here and those in issue in the suit against 
.T. B. Walker. Our review of the record (Exh. D-12, 
H--!Oi, -!35, JB\V Exh D-20, D-23, D-44) fails to reveal 
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tax payments by dependant in exc<'ss of $3,551.:25 with 
reference to all of the land involn.•d in uoth law sun, 
from 1920 to the pn•sent. The taxes assessed again~~ 
all the property from 1 ~20 to the 1%:2 totaled $5,G-!~.ti:i 
(.JB\V Exh D-20, D-23, D--1-±) . 
Defendant was dealing with an 8-± Yl'ar old wurnan 
whose mind was at least failing and whose memory had 
failed. 1 le carefully removed her from lwr home en. 
vironment to execute the deed::;, even though movemeut 
was slow and painful for her ( R 31~), rather than 
bring a notary to her. In her own hollH', she might re-
member her other children, or Homa might eome hum• 
earlv. He returned his mother while Roma was away . " 
and contrived to complete the transaction in seem~·. 
He then follO\ved a pattern of conduct which is always 
indicative of sharp practice; he hid the executed deeill 
for five years until his mother's death without record-
ation, and recorded them within two days thereafter. 
F 
The Participation of Defendant in 
Preparing the Deed 
Defendant and no one else made the arrangementi 
for preparation of the deeds. He called the attorne) 
(R--101), the deeds were delivered to him, and he movec 
his mother out of her home to sign them. He even ar 
ranged for the acknowledgement to be taken by a bani 
officer who was a stranger to Minnetta (R-317) afte 
banking hours. 
18 
G 
The Time And Manner of Offering 
,"i'1u1:1c.stio11s and Adi·icc 
I>d•·rnlant's timing was, of course, excellent. Des-
i 1ik llis prott>stations that his mother had dt:>termined 
•. 11 tltis 1·<>1ll'Sl' of eonduct years earlier, it was in 195-l 
that '11· pn·vaih•d on her to sign deeds. She was con-
rnks<·i11g from an illnc>ss which required hospitalization 
and at·t·1·ntuatl>d her symptoms of mental deterioration. 
I la luul lw1·n foreed by circumstances of her own illness 
t11 rnovP into 8alt Lake. Roma, just recovered from 
ht·art surg.•ry, was working or seeking work in Salt 
La.kP. ~l inntc•tta was particularly confused, unable to 
rP1111>mlwr pn•nts of a few moments before and delight-
fully t raetabll'. 
Then' is little evidence of the actual advice de-
fendant gave his mother. From his deposition, we 
know hP of t'Prt>d her $1,000.00 per acre for the property 
in 19-l'i (Deposition - page 41; R. 86). We also know he ad-
vi:·wd lwr against selling tracts to strangers in 1933 
I D<·position - page 3-1) and 1947 (Deposition - page 
::;i l. 111 195-1, by his own testimony, he "told mother 
that H. A. said a quitclaim deed could be prepared and 
~iw11 to 11w, and she agreed that was all right" (R. 
-!U-1). TlH' idPa of the conveyances was clearly implanted 
Ii~· dl'f Pndant. He admits having discussions with her 
about tlw pro1wrty "at intervals" in 1954. There can 
hf• littlt> doubt about the amount of emphasis defendant 
.!!'aw to his own contributions or his failure to mention 
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Ila's and Roma's. There is only doubt that ~linnetta 
could comprehend. 
H 
The Grantor's Condition of .llind And Body 
Minnetta's physical condition is not even a mat. 
ter of controversy. She suffered for years from open 
sores on her legs; she was hump-backed and deformed 
from arthritic disease; she was unable to eliminate 
naturally because of pyloric obstruction, and her storu .. 
ach had to be pumped with awesome rPgularity .. The 
"consultation record" of Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple (page 
8 of Exh - p 9) includes a resume of l\Iinnetta's formid .. 
able array of physical ailments. 
As to Minnetta's mental condition, there is testi-
mony in abundance. Defendant maintains she was fully 
alert and able to comprehend the consequences of her 
acts in 1954 and not so impaired mentally as to be sub-
ject to his influence. Plaintiffs and their ·witnesses, on 
the other hand, testified as to the advanced state of her 
senility in 1954. Defendant's witnesses, inadvertantly, 
often contributed to the evidence of mental deterioration. 
There is, for instance, this sequence from direct exam-
ination of Dr. Harold E. Young, Jr., defendant's '\fit. 
ness (R 301): 
"Q. Now, Doctor with regard to the illnesses 
which vou have described that she was suf· 
f ering ·from, I will ask you whether or not 
any of those would have any effect upon her 
mentality as far as her competency mentally 
is concerned. 
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Tl IE COl'RT: You mean as of a certain 
datl>! 
~IR BOYER: \Yell, as of when she was in 
thP hospital to start with . 
.A. Yt>s. I think the debilitation caused bv the 
pyloric obstruction could cause some mental 
ehan~es at the time. 
Q. ~\ml would this be something that would be 
eontinual, or would it be a temporary thing 
and clear up Y 
A. It could be a temporary thing, yes, Sir. 
Q. And was this condition cleared up at the 
time that she was in the hospital in 1954 T 
A. According to my hospital notes, the last note 
at tlw hospital when she left the hospital on 
5/18/5-l indicates that she was improving, 
hut I have a note, "She doesn't remember 
very well," that she was eating better, and 
her leg was essentially the same. That is the 
last note on the hospitalization." 
Dr. Young testified he'd been seeing Minnetta for 
yt•ars, but he nwrely thought she recognized him (R-309) 
and, on most occasions when he visited her, he thought 
slw was competent - the plain inference being that, on 
sonw oecru;ions, he thought her incompetent (R-303). 
"l'ompetPncy" is, of course, a word of art which is not 
used carelessly. Dr. Young thought Minnetta drifted 
ht•tween competency and incompetency, but there is no 
r1uestion as to his opinion about her senility. At page 
31() of the Record, on redirect, he stated that opinion as 
simply and starkly as possible: "She was senile". It 
would not be unusual for her simply to giggle, for in-
1-'tn.nce, when asked who Dr. Young was on the occasions 
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of his visits tR-313). He could not give her instru t· c ions 
for he~ ~are. They. had to be given to others (R-3lG). 
Her ability to function as a sentient being depended on a 
factor so precarious as the degree of her hydration wh 
she suffered from chronic failure to move fluids into t . . er 
mtestmes. 
Gladys Walker, defendant's wife, gave this testi. 
mony on cross examination beginning at page -±5i of 
the Record: 
"Q. y. our testimony is that you saw no change 
m your grandmother's mental condition from 
1954 until approximately the time of her 
death except during periods when she was 
ilH 
A. Oh you could tell a difference in her mental 
- old age coming on naturally, but I felt she 
was competent. 
Q. During the entire period~ 
A. Yes. She was failing all along, but she wll.'!n't 
really gone." 
In the statement of facts, much of the evidenee of 
senile dementia is reviewed at length. There is credible 
evidence of Minnetta's disorientation, inability to recog· 
nize hf>r children, forgetting having eaten, eternally 
shuffling to and from the outside toilet and, when co-
herent, speaking as if she were living in her young adult-
hood. These are, according to Dr. Roy McDonald, the 
symptoms of senile dementia ( R 102). That Minnetla 
could sign her name is not evidence to the contrary 
(R-103). 
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While <lef endant presented some evidence of a limit-
··<l ahility on his mother's part to comprehend and re-
spon(l in 19:>+, that evidence could hardly be held to 
1 o111p1·l th1• trial judge to find that Minnetta was capable 
of rPsisting- c!Pfondant's pressure. If anything, the total 
pvidt>nre rornpels findings that Minnetta did not, at the 
time sl11· signed the deeds, understand the consequences 
of her aet, recognize the natural recipients of her bounty 
or romprehend the nature and value of her property. 
ln Pvaluating the total evidence, particular weight 
slwnld 1w given, we believe, to these facts: 
1. The only disinterested witnesses who had 
close association and repeated opportunity to ob-
sPrve .Minnetta in late 1954, Signe Holmgren and 
Yivian Biltz, testified to her lack of mental ca-
pacity, not by giving opinion but by describing her 
conduct and her utterances - the repeated "aren't 
they pretty" about flowers and quilting blocks 
which she simply held in her lap, the statements 
that she "hadn't eaten all day" made within min-
utes after her meals, and her inability to compre-
hend who Ila was (R, pp 168, 177, 178). 
2. "\Vhenever any trained person had occa-
sion to observe Minnetta in 1954 and make official 
notation of her condition, he invariably made 
c01mnent about the signs of her mental deterior-
ation. Dr. Dalrymple (Exh P-9, page 8) wrote: 
''History is difficult to obtain because of pa-
tient's mental confusion", and he noted the bilat-
eral arcus senilis, the generalized sclerosis and 
the advanced arthritic involvment. The nursing 
notes for .May 14 include the statement that Min-
netta was able to communicate her complaints of 
"pain all over'', but also that she "does not re-
member eating, dressing leg, Dr. being in, etc." 
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Dr. Young testified that his last written notat' 
before her discharge was of Minnetta's fail·ion 
ing memory. 
I 
The Absence of Independent Advice 
In Jardine v. Archibald (supra), this court com. 
mented on the significance of the donor's having received 
independent advice as follows: 
"Of cour~e, among t~e elements which might 
be of great importance m most cases in deter. 
mining alleged undue influence where a confiden. 
tial relationship exists, is whether independent 
advice had been received by the donor, and in 1 
some instances without such proof the donee 
might not be able to sustain his burden of proving 1 
good faith. Pomeroy's Equity Jur. 5th Ed., Sec. 
956, pages 796-98 states the rule thus: 
'There are a number of cases which Jar 
down the rule generally that, in order to r~. 1 
but the presumption of undue influence or 
unfairness arising from the fact that the 
parties to a transaction stood in a confiden. 
tial or fiduciary relation, it is necessary to 
show that the one reposing confidence acted 
upon independent advice. However, in most ' 
jurisdictions where the question has a.risen 
it appears that the courts have not laid.down , 
any such hard and fast rule. The q~esti.on ~ 
to whether such independent advice is es· 
sential is ordinarily determined with respect 1 
to the nature of the confidence reposed, the 
nature of the transaction, and the cireum· 
stances in each particular case. In other 
words, a rule requiring proof of independent 
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advice is ordinarily applied where it is a 
reasonable requirement and where the cir-
cumstances are such that it would be diffi-
cult to show the fairness of the transaction 
without proof of independent advice. The 
rule is peculiarly applicable in gift cases • • • 
it would seem that proof of independe~t ad-
vice is not indispensable where other satis-
factory evidence is available to show that 
there was no abuse of confidence and that 
the transaction was fair and free from the 
undue influence inferred from the relation-
ship.' 
To the same effect see the Annotation in 123 
A.L.R. commencing on page 1505." 
In this case, there is not the slightest evidence of 
11innetta's having obtained advice of anyone but defend-
ant about the wisdom or fairness of giving all her prop-
Prty to defendant. Defendant made all the arangements. 
Exct-pt for defendant's self-serving testimony, the record 
would show that defendant was not only the prime mover 
hut the only one. 
J 
The Adequacy of Consideration 
The record is clear that, at the time the deeds in 
question were signed, defendant gave his mother no 
more than $10.00 consideration. (Deposition of Austin 
Walker, p. 41). He makes no allegation that he promised 
her any further payment, and he made no further pay-
ment except as a part of his intricate manipulations of 
the trust assets he received from Ila. 
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Defendant persists in the plaint that he is n 10r~ 
deserving than the plaintiffs and has built up trem en. 
dous equities because of his having sacrificPd himself 
in paying the taxes on and operating the farm. He SIJ 
strongly relies on this position that we feel compellPd to 
analyze it in some detail. 
Te begin with, defendant's operation of the farru 
was a business venture. The evidence is unrefuted that 
defendant had the use of the farm upon the understand-
ing that he would pay the taxes assessed against the 
farm land. That this kind of contract was the basis of 
defendant's use and occupancy of the farm is the testi-
mony of defendant and his witnesses. Exhibit P-lt of 
the J. B. \V alker case is a letter to H. A. Smith, dated 
July 16, 1952 - just two years before the signature of 
the deeds which here concern us. It was signed by J. B. 
Walker, one of defendant's witnesses in this case, and it 
contains the following language: 
"All these tax receipts were given to my 
brother, Austin L. "\V alker, when he was redeem-
ing the property on taxes which he had not paid. 
which were a part of the consideration for him 
having the use of the property, rent free, from 
1920 to date." 
J. B. "\Valker also testified (JBW Record, p 156), when 
asked by what agreement A. L. Walker had paid taxes 
on the farm, as follows: 
"that he would have the use of the property to 
take care of the taxes upon it and maintain it &I 
least in the condition which he received it." 
Defendant made no attempt to refute that testimony. He 
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('orroborakd it. At page -!35 of the Record, he said, 
··tlwn· \\"(•n· yt>an; when I was not concerned for the pay-
uwnt of those taxes, ... that mother gave me a sum of 
uiorn·: tu iiay for the taxes which were delinquent pre-
Yiou:-i to that time". This can only be interpreted as an 
ac·kno,,· ]pdgt>ment that he had a contractual obligation, 
;1,o to :-01111· yPars, to pay the taxes. It is also clear from 
t!H· n·eord that defendant occupied both the pink and 
orange tracts (of Exhibit 3) on the same understanding. 
i[e tPstified (!{ -!37) that his right to possession was 
so wdl rP<'ognized that he could have excluded his moth-
1•r "if thert> had been any difference" between them. At 
pages .±:)-1-, -!35 and -!36 of the Record, he testified that 
hP had the same kind of possession and control of the 
pink property m.; of the orange. 
Tht> undisputed fact is, then, that defendant had 
pos~wssion and control of the entire farm for the con-
sideration of his payment of the taxes. Exhibits D-20, 
D-:23 and D--1-1 of the J. B. Walker case are an ex-
haustive compilation, made by J. B. Walker, of the taxes 
assessed against the properties making up the farm 
from rn:w to 196:2 and by whom those taxes were paid. 
Those exhibits indicate a total payment by defendant 
of $3,551.:25. Defendant's checks, which are in evidence, 
total to something less than that. Mr. Fletcher, plain-
tiffs' witness as land appraiser, testified that a reason-
abl1· rental for the farm from 1933 to trial date would 
!tan· been $18,270.00 (JBW Record, p 2m). Since there 
is no other evidence on the point, it must be concluded 
that defendant rented the farm for about one-fifth of 
an adequate rental. There is no evidence of the profit 
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defendant actually made from the sale of the prod 
• UCP 
from the f ann. He refused to answer an interrogaton 
on the point (JB'V Record, p. 17, interrogatory No ~ 
• • 1, 
p 21, answer no. 7) and no competent evidence was 
fp. 
ceived at the trial. It is difficult to see how he estab-
lishes a strong equitable position, however, by having 
taken advantage of his mother for so many years. -
There is testimony from many witnesses about Min. 
netta's cows, how much of defendant's hay they ate, how 
much feed Minnetta had to buy elsewhere and how 
much in dairy products defendant received in return. 
By defendant's own testimony, however, Minnetta had 
disposed of all her cows by 1946 (R. 418). In 1947, again 
by defendant's testimony (Deposition p. 41) he offered 
to pay his mother $1,000.00 per acre for her land. Cer-
tainly at that time, when his mother was fully compe-
tent, defendant and his mother did not agree that he 
had "earned" the farm. Between 1947 and 1954, defen-
dant continued to use the farm for a token rental, gave 
his mother no hay and made no other contribution 
which would establish him, in equity, as his sisters' su-
perior. During that same period, until 1952, Ila and 
Roma provided Minnetta's financial support and acted 
as her nurse, housekeeper and cook. When Ila becamt 
ill in 1952, Minnetta went to Nevada and stayed with 
plaintiff Fay Walker Lake for at least a year. Defendant 
helped his mother financially only when both Ila and 
Roma were too ill to be employable. 
The only major change which occurred between 194; 
and 1954 was the deterioration of Minnetta's mental 
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apparatn:-. lt was not until that deterioration had pro-
••re:-:-t>d to the point where Minnetta could not remem-
.~ 
Jwr ]wr <'hildrt-n - at least when they were out of sight 
__ that defendant succeeded in the procurement of 
jlinnPtta':-; signature on the instruments which disin-
lwritPd five of her children - including the ones who 
!iad <imw the most for her. 
Defi>ndant has cited the several Utah cases which 
Mid that the doctrine of confidential relationship has 
application only when there is a showing (1) of in-
\'quality between the parties and (2) that the defendant 
oecupi<:>d a superior position. In every one of those cases, 
l)lle of the el<:>ments was obviously lacking. In Brad-
lmry r. Rasmussen, on which defendant heavily relies, 
the evidence of inequality was entirely lacking, and the 
eourt would not sustain a finding of confidential re-
lation:-;hi p or give plaintiff the benefit of the presump-
tion of undue influence in the absence of such evidence. 
ln every other case defendant has cited for his claim 
of trial court error in finding a confidential relation-
ship, such Pvidence has been similarly lacking. Where 
the two elements are shown to be present, as in Johnson 
c. Johuson (supra), this court has not hesitated to give 
effect to the presumption. 
'rh<:> one case defendant cites where the facts are 
:-;omewhat similar to those in the instant case is Ander-
son r. Thomas, 108 U 252, 159 P 2d 142. At page 12 of 
his brief, defendant presents a statement of the facts 
of that case within quotes as if it were an excerpt from 
tlw court's opinion. It is not. We are certain this oo-
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curred by inadvertance, and point it out only so th" 
court will recognize that the abstract is defendant's 
and not the court's. ln the Anderson case, the trial 
court found for the dPf endant, that there was no undue 
influence. In considering plaintiff's appeal, this court 
reviewed the evidence of tlw grantor's mental impair. 
ment and found nothing to suggest such impainnt-nt 
I 
let alone enough to reverse the trial court finding~. All 
the evidence was to the effect that the grantor \I'll.' 
perfectly able to deal with the grantee and others on 
terms of reasonable equality. Interestingly, the plain-
tiffs appear never to have raised the question of con-
fidential rt>lationship, and the court doesn't comment 
on the doctrine or the presumption that arises from il 
We believe the comment of Justice Turner, in his 
concurring opinion in the Anderson case, has relevancy 
to the instant case: 
"I think courts should accept wills and con-
veyances made by the extremely aged or severely 
ill with great caution. It is universally known that 
serious illness and age wear down both body and 
mind. Wills and conveyances, generally speaking, 
should be made before the final turn, the time 
when it becomes apparent that there is no hope 
for recovery. In every land and in many families 
there are some so saturated with greed that they. 
like vultures watch the sick and dying and await 
the opportu~e time to strike and ta~e e_verything 
possible. Greed has no regard for Justice or de-
cency. Courts should lend no encouragement t& 
people of such character. It i~ much better thai 
property be distributed according to statutory lat 
than have the courts give invitation or approval 
to undue influence and greed." 
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Dt·frndant has eited and quoted from all the Utah 
<·a,;e,; in whi('h elairns of undue influence have been as-
:-t>rted and rPjeetl>d. The problem is a recurrent one, and 
tlwre an· as many cases where plaintiffs have failed as 
tlwn• arP <·asPs where they have succeeded in proving 
lUuhw influence. ~pace prohibits our analyzing each 
<'a,;l' in ddail, but we ask the court to note that, in every 
<':t,;<· eited hy defendant, either (1) the trial court found 
for tlw lh·frndant on credible and competent evidence 
and this eourt merely upheld its findings, or (2) there 
"·as no eYidence of mental debility on the part of the 
grantor or dominance on the part of the grantee. 
The instant case is, on the contrary, a case where 
the trial court found for the plaintiffs, and the evidence 
oi the grantor's lack of ability to resist defendant's pres-
sures or to exercise independent judgment, even if one 
('onsiders the testimony of defendant's witnesses only, 
is owrwlwlrning. The plaintiff's evidence of Minnetta's 
disorientation, complete failure of memory, and inability 
to recognize her children (we believe the episode of Min-
netta \; failure to recognize Ila at her funeral - R 124 
and 1S9 - is particularly revealing) would support find-
ings of total incompetency. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN RE-
CEIVING EVIDENCE AND MAKING FINDINGS AS TO UN-
DUE INFLUENCE EVEN THOUGH THE PRETRIAL ORDER 
FAILED TO FRAME THAT ISSUE SPECIFICALLY. 
Defendant's first contention, in his argument under 
Point I, is that the pre-trial order failed to frame an 
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issue with reference to undue influence. The order Wa.<, 
of co~rse,. written by the pre-trial judge after length~' 
pre-tnal, mvolved the several issues of two lawsu·t 
I ~. 
and was considerably longer than most. Plaintiffs did 
state their contention of undue influence in the general 
discussion of competency during the pre-trial conferenc ~. 
but the plaintiffs' specific contention in this regard w~ 
not incorporated in the pre-trial order. 
In the trial of the case, plaintiffs proceeded from the 
opening statement on the theory that undue influenc~ 
was an issue. That issue was clearly joined in the plead-
ings - plaintiffs alleging the procurement of the deeds 
by undue influence in the Complaint, and defendant de-
nying it in his Answer. During the trial, reference Wa.5 
made to the fact that certain testimony was being adduc-
ed because of its relevancy on the issue of undue influ-
ence, and no attempt was then made to exclude it. The 
trial judge himself stated repeatedly that undue influ-
ence was an issue (R 296, 338, 409, 416) without objec-
tion from defendant, and defendant adduced evidence 
m rebuttal on the issue (R-409). 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires that the Court shall make an order limiting the 
issues "to those not disposed of by admissions or a.gm 
ments of counsel". There were no admissions or agree-
ments at the pre-trial conference which could have elim· 
inated undue influence as an issue, and it was sheer in· 
advertance that specific language on the point was not 
incorporated in the order. 
We believe the defendant should have made some 
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110111 t of his contPntion that undue influence was not an 
issu1• at the tinw of trial instead of permitting plaintiffs 
ti> proeP(~d on that theory. The policy of Rule 15(b) 
:-;lwuld in any event be held to control. "When issues not 
rai~e<l ... are tried by express or implied consent of 
thP parties, they shall be treated as if they had been 
nused ... " 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS ON THE 
"DEAD MAN'S STATUTE." 
l t appears to be defendant's position that if, in a 
proceeding of this kind, any evidence of undue influence 
is pnmitted to be introduced by the estate's administra-
tor, the adverse party must be permitted to testify as to 
all conversations, matters and transactions which must 
have been equally within his knowledge and that of the 
dPeeased. It is therefore his position that the plaintiff, 
in an action of this kind, may not undertake to prove his 
allegations by evidence of any kind without waiving the 
protedion of the statute. It can hardly have been the 
inh•ntion of the legislature that a party against whom an 
administrator proceeds should become competent to tes-
tify about the proscribed matters as soon as the admin-
i:;trator introduces any evidence at the trial. It is almost 
startling that, in his Point I, defendant maintains plain-
tiffs adduced no evidence of undue influence, and, in 
Point II, he maintains plaintiff waived statutary pro-
tection by adducing such evidence. 
Defendant points to no instance, in the course of 
thP trial, \vhere plaintiffs were allowed to testify about 
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tram;action::-; et1ually within the knowledge of defendant 
and deceased, hut defendant was not. As a matter of fll('l 
the court was most scrupulou::-; in finding waivers. For 
example, defendant did not record the deeds in 4uestion 
from the time of their signature until hi::-; mother'8 death. 
more than five year::-; later. \\re believe his reasons wer~ 
obvious; he had procured the signature::-; in secret and 
if plaintiffs became aware of the instruments, thev 
would certainly have litigated ~linnetta's competenc;· 
when her mental condition could have been scientifieaU;· 
investigated. Since delivery was a transaction which 
must have been equally within the knowledge of the 
defendant and the deceased, plaintiffs objected to de-
fendant's testifying about delivery. The court ruled, 
however, that defendant could so testify because plain. 
tiffs, in taking defendant's deposition, had asked him 
how much money he had paid his mother "at the time 
of the conveyances". By using the word ''conveyances'' 
instead of "signing", plaintiffs waived the protection of 
the statute, said the court, as to defendant's testifying 
about delivery and about :Minnetta's conversation at the 
time ( R. 405-6). This is conversation which the bank offi-
cer, by the way, doesn't remember (R. 318). 
Furthermore, the record contains a full exposition of 
the defendant's conduct over the years, and this is the 
conduct which he maintains is the foundation of his great 
merit as compared with his brothers and sisters. He was 
even able to adduce the testimony of his brother J. B. 
Walker (who was certainly committed to an agreement 
with defendant that he would help defendant to keep the 
pink property if defendant would help J. B. to keep the 
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1 ,rnn~1· -- :-;PP diseussion at R. 361 ff.) that ~linnetta had 
:-;aid s]J(' \ms g-iving dPfrndant the property in consid-
i•rat1()n of his S(•rvices. Only Robert :F'rost could have 
pnt rnorP poit,rnant words into Minnetta's mouth than 
,lid .1. H. Walker. 
Tlw trial jndge was apparently persuaded that Min-
netta had so11ie conception of what she was doing when 
:-;]w sig1wd tlw dPeds. He did not find her incom~tent. 
Bnt the trial judge was convinced that whatever motive 
or ich·a sh1· might have expressed was implanted by de-
1\·ndant. What she said was not even material if she 
,\·as unduly induced to accept the idea she was express-
ing. lf defendant persuaded his mother he was entitled 
to tht> land becam;e he had paid taxes on it and farmed 
it, he implanted a false belief. He had, on the evidence 
in this c·ast>, really takPn advantage of her by paying less 
than a fifth of adequate rental. 
lt is intPresting that defendant also paid the taxes 
against and farmed the land J.B. Walker claimed in the 
l'ompanion case. J. B. \V alker has felt no moral com-
pubion to convey that land to defendant. 
The rPcord herein is so full of the kind of testimony 
Ul'ft>ndant claims he was prevented from giving that the 
l'nurt's rulings are hardly reversible error. To the ex-
tent that defendant made a record of the excluded testi-
mony, as provided by Rule 43 (c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Prnepdure, it would appear that the testimony would have 
l1ppn cumulative and immaterial as to whether Minnetta 
was unduly influenced. The question is not whether 
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she was motivakd but wheth(•r she was undub' · d . 
.J Ill UCl'iJ 
to lX' so motivated. 
We believe the cases, including those cited by di-. 
fendant, support the trial court's rulings. There is nr 
waiver of statutory protection when an administrat<n 
introduces evidence except as to the specific transactii,
1
, 
to which that evidence relates. In particular, we wouia 
refer this Court to Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Opensli,
111
, 
Inv. Co., 102 G 509, 132 P. 2d 388; Cook v. Jones, 115 r. 
536, 206 P 2d 630; and In re Pitcher's Estate, 114 [i~. 
197 p 2d 143. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A 
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDA~T 
AND HIS SISTER ILA. 
The finding of a confidential relationship between 
defendant and his sister was entirely unnecessary to 
support the judgment and final order as it related h 
Ila's property. The court did not, of course, make a finri-
ing of undue influence or avoid the transfers from Ila 
to defendant. If it is defendant's position (despite the 
testimony of his witness, Mrs. Strickland, R. 330) thai 
Ila did not repose trust and confidence in him, we wouM 
see no harm in expunging that finding from the record 
The order that defendant account, however, resul~ 
from his admission that he received the property m 
trust. He is asked to make the kind of accounting trustet'i 
must always make and distribute any remaining pro~ 
erty to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
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lf tlH' finding <ll'fendant questions is error, it is 
harnd1·:':' t>rror. Plaintiffs felt it was material, in a case 
11·hi1·h put:' at i:-;sm• the question of defendant's capacity 
f11 r 1n1po~ing his will on the mentally affected, that Ila 
11·11uld :'1·l1•d a:-; trustee, in 1954, a person about whom, 
111 1 !J;):!, :'hl' :'aid this: ( Exh P-8, page 5) 
"l have never seen so much crust as the A. L. 
family has. \Vhen mother left, Gladys took every-
thing- tlwre was around the place that could be 
Paten." 
an<l on pag-P 3: 
"that doet'n't mean I don't have to pay back every-
one but Aust and as I told Mary that was a means 
of my eollecting what they owe me." 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COVRT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DE-
FENDANT COMPENSATION FOR HIS SERVICES AS 
TRl1STEE. 
])pfendant takes an incredible posture with reference 
to hi8 trusteeship. He admits the trust but denies respon-
~ibility to account. Plaintiffs asked for an aceounting 
and 'n're nwt with the flat statement that the trust 
a8~ets had bePn exhausted. This is even defendant's posi-
tion in the pleadings filed in this lawsuit. 
The evidence is that defendant still holds the real 
pro1wrty and securities he received from Ila. Out of one 
side of his mouth, he tells the Internal Revenue Service 
that his expenditures for Minnetta after 1954 were out 
of his own resources. Out of the other side of his mouth, 
he tt>lls the court and plaintiffs that those expenditures 
WPre out of trust assets. 
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He admits comingling of the trust assets with hi
8 
own (R 427) and he claims to haYt> acquir0d those assets 
by paying money for his motht1 r between 1954 and 1959. 
Presumably, he df'cides whether he is buying the trust 
assets by these devices after he discovers whether the 
trust assets (realty and securities) are appreciating or 
depreciating. 
Defendant's total course of conduct - his refusal 
to account, his self dealing, his comingling of assets_ 
has violated his obligation as fiduciary. He cannot now 
demand compensation. Extended citation of authority 
on this point should not be necessary. 'Ne quote th~ 
following, however, from Scott's Abridgment of the 
Law of Trusts (Austin Wakeman Scott, 1960, Little. 
Brown And Co.), Section - 243, page 521: 
"Where a trustee has committed a breach of 
trust, the court may in its discretion either allow 
him full compensation or deny him all compensa. 
tion or allow him reduced compensation .... " 
"The court has denied compensation whe~ 
the trustee has repudiated the trust, or where h~ 
has misappropriated trust property, or where he 
has failed to keep accounts . . . " 
The trial court simply denied compensation in this ag· 
gravatl:'d situation. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT A LIEN FOR TAXES AND IMPROVEMENTS ON 
HIS MOTHER'S PROPERTY. 
The evidence is that defendant contracted to oe.cupY 
and occupied the pink and orange property of Exhibiti 
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i'or paying the taxes. There is no contrary evidence. De-
fl'Hdant dt·ci<lt>d what erops to plant and what produce 
il' :o:\·11. HP rPfusPd to answer an interrogatory about his 
:-:ak~ and inl'orne from farming - at least he never did 
an~\n•r it. 11 l' testified he had complete control of the 
1
,ink and orangP property. Any testimony that he got 
h,: than value for anything he gave the family is m-
<'i>nc·lu~iv<' and refuted. 
Def Pndant received the use of property having area-
·'onah!P n·ntal valu<' of $18,270.00 (JBW Record 297). 
He pai<l taxes totalling $3,551.25 (JBW Exh. D-20, D-
2:l, D--1-1, D-12, R. 407, 435). This was cheap rent for 
the u~(' of -10 acres of land for 42 years. He has certainly 
,-Jinwn no entitlPment to reimbursement of amounts ex-
IH'ndt>d undt•r thPse circumstances. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Huie 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
c·nwring new trials, provides a wide latitude for the trial 
eourt in actions which are tried without a jury. The rule 
provides: 
''On a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment 
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment." 
Sinee this case involves an action tried without a 
.i 11ry, it is important to note the distinction between jury 
and nonjury trials as relates to motions for new trials. 
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Each case cited bv Appellant in his brief involved · . • a JUr1 
trial, and they do not assist the court in this case e · X~fl' 
for some of the general criteria for granting new triab 
which would be equally applicable to both types of e&~, 
When an action is tried without a jury, the <'~)Un 
necessarily has greater freffiom in determining what lb 
action should be on a motion for new trial. 6 Moorf\ 
Federal Practice, p. 3772, Para. 59.07. 
It has been uniformly held by this Court that a n~w 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence will not\){' 
granted unless the new evidence is of a character as i~ 
likely to change the result of the case. Universal Invest. 
ment Co. v. Carpets, Incorpora.ted, ______ Utah ---... ,400 P.2d 
564; Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264: 
Tanner v. Stevens, 8 Utah 75, 30 P. 24. In a jury trial 
the court, in considering a motion for new trial, can at 
best only conjecture as to whether or not the new evidence 
would have changed the jury's verdict. This is not the 
case when the court which heard the evidence and made 
the finding is also considering the new evidence. In this 
situation, the court is able to weigh the new evideneii 
against that presented at the trial, and will know abso· 
lutely if this new evidence would have resulted in a 
different finding. 
The quoted provisions of Rule 59 (a) apply a distinct-
ive procedure in the case of non-jury trials. The rule 
permits the court to determine if the new evidence is of 
such importance as to be decisive upon its :findings. If it 
finds this to be the case, it can then have the case reopened 
and the additional evidence adduced. This procedure rec-
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ognizes the t•xpense involved in the trial de novo of a case. 
Although an entire new trial is necessary in a jury case, it 
~erves no useful purpose in most non-jury cases. 
ThiR C'Ourt has consistently followed the rule that the 
,jp11 ial or granting of a motion for new trial rests in the 
<li:-;erPtion of the trial judge and is reviewable only when 
then· is a plain showing of an abuse of that discretion. 
{" 11 irl'rsal /nustment Co. v. Carpets, Incorporated, 
,.,upra; Cptou·n Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. Flint, 122 
nah 298, ~-19 P.2d 826; Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 
~.J:7 P .:!d :.W.t. 
It is submitted that the review of a trial court's de-
nial of a motion for a new trial based upon newly dis-
l'owred evidence should be even more constricted than 
this, where the case is tried before the court without a 
jury. Respondents know of no case where this court has 
('onsidered the distinction between motions for new trials 
in jury and non-jury trials. There appears to be a pau-
eity of decisions on this point in other jurisdictions as 
well. 66 C.J .S. p. 71, New Trials §3, makes reference to 
new trials applying particularly to jury trials. The state-
ment then goes on to say that some jurisdictions permit 
new trials after a decision by a court. 
In the case of Arias v. Springer, 42 N. Mex. 350, 78 
P.2d 153, the court states that it is unnecessary to grant 
a new trial in an equity case, since reopening the case to 
take additional testimony is adequate, and that new trials 
apply to law cases only. The court did not specifically 
discuss the distinction between jury and non-jury trials. 
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The point appearing to lw one of fin;t illl}lf"'". ,~.,ion 
for this Court, Respondents urge the wisdom of a dif. 
ferent rule for non-jury cases from that in jury C'.asei 
as regards motions for new trials on the basis of new!r 
discovered evidence. \Vhere the motion is address~ 
to the Court which was the trier of the facts, the app~J. 
late court should take due note that the ruling of the 
trial court determines whether or not the new evidentf 
would have been decisive in the original case. This Coun 
should reverse a denial of such a motion only when tlif· 
new evidence, coupled with that properly admitted in t]1, 
trial of the cause, requires a different result in the casi: 
as a matter of law. 
Turning from the question of the extent to whicb 
this court should review the denial of the motion for ne\\" 
trial to the new evidence Appellant sought to introducii, 
it is seen that this evidence would not be decisive in am 
regard. As a matter of fact it would have been contra. 
dictory of Appellant's own testimony. The affidavit~ 
relate to a period around 1948-49 when the witnes8P.' 
allegedly were told that Minnetta was going to kee;' 
the property for Appellant so he could place a super-
market on the property. 
In his deposition, Appellant testified to a seri~~ 
of discussions where real estate agents and other people. 
in 1947 and thereafter, had sought to buy a part of the 
property and that shortly after this time he reached an 
agreement with his mother whereby he would purcha.11 
the property for $1,000.00 per acre (Austin Walker 
Deposition pp. 34 to 41.) This agreement, aceording to 
Appellant's statements, was not changed by any further 
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di:·wussion betwt>l'n appellant and his mother at least 
until rn:>-1. ClParly the evidence by which Appellant 
~"nght a nPW trial would have been superceded by this 
la1t·r agTi>Pmt•nt which appellant never consummated 
Ji~· tlw payuH'nt of the purchase price. 
The af fi<lavits further fail to show due diligence on 
.\Jlrwllant'~ part in attempting to adduce the evidence 
at the trial. As to the Ray 8mith evidence, Appellant 
athnits talking to l\lr. 8mith prior to the trial about 
.\Ir. Smith's negotiations with l\1innetta. Appellant's 
affidavit only says that he failed to ask Mr. Smith the 
din•et questions involved in the suit. It is difficult to 
1wn·eivP what conversations Appellant could have had 
with Mr. Smith relative to the case which would not 
mvolve the matter in the affidavit. In any event, it is 
:mlnnitted a showing of due diligence cannot be predi-
eatl'd upon the failure of the moving party to ask a 
prospective witness the only material questions which 
tht· ,,·itn1:ss could be expected to answer. 
The Appellant's affidavit does not give any insight 
as to how he learned of the proffered testimony of Glen 
C. ~ehmidt. He merely states he learned of this in Janu-
ary, 19G3. \\~ e can only conjecture whether or not he had 
any information about Mr. Schmidt before trial which 
through due diligence could have developed his testi-
mony at the trial. To obtain a new trial, the Appellant 
must show that he could not have developed the testi-
mony at the trial through the exercise of due diligence. 
Without a showing by Appellant of the steps he took to 
lParn of the testimony, we cannot determine if due dili-
f.\"Pner could have produced the witness at the trial. 
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As to Hex Colt•, no lllPntion wa8 madl' bv A1lpt>ll • . 8.llt 
during tlw trial that he had Let•n unable to contact th~ 
witrn•ss, nor did he rt>qm·st a continuanct>, to obtain th,. 
presence of this witness. In Lindsay 1,·. Eccles llotel Cr 
J., 
3 U. 2d. 364, 284 P.2d 477, 478, this failure to app~ 
thl• court of the t>xistencR of a material witness and It 
r1•quest a continuance was lwld to demonstrate a laek 
of due diligence. J<-,urther, the affidavit of Appt-llBlJ· 
indicates that tlw only thing he did after the trial whieb 
was not done bt>fore trial was to telephone Mr. Colti. 
As to each of these witnesses, Appellant has faile<h 
establish due diligence in attempting to produce th~ 
testimony at the trial. The evidence sought to be ad. 
duced from the witnesses would not require a different 
result in the case, is remote in point of time from tbt' 
1954 conveyances, and is contrary to Appellant's testi-
mony of a subsequent agreement to purchase the prop-
erty from his mother for a fixed cash purchase pril'I'. 
For these reasons, Respondents submit the trial court 
did not err in denying Appellant's motion for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court chose to grant relief to plaintifb 
in this case on their proof of undue influence with tM 
assistance of the preswnption which arises upon estah-
lishment of the fact of "confidential relationship." Sintt 
the undue influence finding was a sufficient basis for 
affording plaintiffs all the relief they sought, the court 
considered it unnecessary to find either (1) that MiJ. 
netta was incompetent or (2) that defendant had~ 
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,.,:11·,·d or aC'knowh·dgPd, after l\linnetta's death, that he 
iwld lwr pro1wrty in trust for himself and plaintiffs. 
\\"1· lwli1·w tlw evidt-nce actually compels both ad-
11111111.al fi111lings. Tlw plaintiffs' evidence of Minnetta's 
Jllal iii it y to reeogn ize her children, her disorientation 
a:-: to ti1111· and plaee, her complete failure of memory, 
a111 i tlw dt>wlopment in her of all the classic physical 
.. 1, 11 (·01111tants of mental deterioration is thoroughly con-
,·irll'lll~. To n•fufr it, defendant presented this testi-
111nny : 
l. D1·frndant's daughter said Minnetta didn't know 
what day it was but could say something about 
thP wt>ather . 
. , l)pft•ndant 's wife said Minnetta was failing all 
tlw time but wasn't really "gone." 
:L ~I innetta's physician said Minnetta was clearly 
:-:enile but he thought she was competent on the 
majority of his visits. 
With ref Prence to the acknowledgement by defend-
ant that he took the property only to avoid probate 
and lwld it for tlw heirs, we have the testimony of three 
pt>ople who wPre present when he made that st.atement-
Don Lakt:>, R. E. Walker and Carol Lake (R. 130, 194, 
~ti3 ). In rt•futation, we have only defendant's denial. 
Dt:>fondant apparently contends his testimony is 
111on• crt:>dible than plaintiffs' because he is a school 
t .. achPr and WB.8 a bishop. Without commenting on the1e 
al'< tt•sts of credibility, we would remind the court that 
di.ft->ndant has admitted misrepresenting the source of 
45 
l'u11d:-- i1:--1·d 1'11r \lilllwtta in 1•r•·;1ari11!..; Iii:- ta\ r\'\11r11 an.J 
lia:-- ad11iitt1·1I 1·1111ii11!..;l;11~· t n1:--t ;1:-:--<'l:-- \\1th Iii,- 11wn. 
\\·,. \\111ild al,.;11 p111111 11111 111 t!J,. 1·1Hirt that dt>fi·nq. 
<lilt':- \1it11"""· .I. I\. \\alk1·r. tl',.;t1t'i1·d that Iii· :--p1·nt 111 ,tb 
Thank:--!..;i\ in~· and ( 'liri:--t11i;1:-- 111' I ~1.-1-t \\ itli Iii" 111. 1tLn, 
1 l:. :;-;--;-,:;-;--.;!,and tlii,- t1·:--ti1111111> \Ul:' d1·11i1·d h> plaintif: 
1 
Homa \\'alker Oroek. Plai11t iffs 1 hl'll introdueed .J. B. 
\\'alk1·r':-- diar> for 1~1;1-t \\hidi n·nal:-: that .I. B. \\'alhr 
\\·a:- at l1·a,.;t lllistak1·n in liis t1·sti11i1111> ( l·:\hil1it 1'-] 11 , 
( >11 th1· \\ 11011· n·1·ord thn1· is littl1• rl'ason tog-in• <ll'ft·nd. 
allt's \\ it1wss1•s 111on· ('J'l•d1·1w" tliall plaintiffs', partii·u. 
larl:-· \1·h1·n plaint i !Ts 1·Yid1·1w1· is ah1 ays <·orrohorat1·d hy 
11ospital n·1·ords and oth1·r \\'rittn1 llll'llloranda. 
\\'1• s11li111it that plai11tit't's should lrn\'P liPPTl ~ranted 
n•liPf 1111 \'\'<'!'>- thPory 1·xpn·ssPd i11 thl'ir <'omplaint. l: 
\\'OU\d J11• a !'Hilk injust i1·1• if this ('0111'1 \\ \'l'l' to hold that 
tlt1· trial judg-1' ('ould not n·asonalily han• found. on th• 
1•YidPrn·1·, a 1·m1t'id1·11tial n·lationship in whi<·h d!'f .. ndac• 
had tltl' dorninant position arnl of \1·hi<·h h1• took adran-
tag-P by pro<·uring- tlu• sig-mltun· of dP<•ds <·onnyin~ ail 
his moth<•r's proJH•rty to him and d1•JH'iYing- ht>r oth~r 
h1•i rs of tlH·ir ju~t inheritam·e. 
HPspPetfully submitted, 
FRASK J. ALLEX 
THO.'.\L\S C. (TTllBERT 
3f>l South State Street 
Salt Lake City, l·tah 
Attorneys for Respo11dl'11fs 
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